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Case No. 20090782 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
DERRICK WADE GARDNER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant, Derrick Wade Gardner, appeals from convictions for 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West Supp. 2007), and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the deputy conduct a lawful weapons frisk of defendant? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is a 
mixed question of fact and law. The court's factual findings are reviewed for 
clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ]f 11, 100 P.3d 1222. Its legal 
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conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its 
application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,111,103 
P.3d699. 
2. Did the prosecutor fail to comply with the notice requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (West 2004)? 
Standard of Review. "This court reviews a district court's ruling on a 
mistrial motion for an abuse of discretion." State v. McCloud, 2005 UT App 466, 
1 9,126 P.3d 775. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions relevant to this appeal are reproduced in 
Addendum A: U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gardner was charged with (1) possession of methamphetamine with 
intent to distribute, a second degree felony, and (2) possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R.l-2. A preliminary hearing was held 
on August 21,2008 and Gardner was bound over for trial. See R.23,42,186.l 
Motion to suppress evidence from search. Gardner moved to suppress the 
evidence, arguing that the search of his person for weapons violated the Fourth 
1
 See discussion, infra, at 25-26. 
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Amendment. R.23-30. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court 
denied the motion and entered corresponding findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. R.42-43,48A-50; R.186 (Addendum B). 
Motion in limine to exclude testimony regarding distribution. On the 
morning of trial, Gardner's counsel moved to exclude testimony from the 
sheriffs deputies "relating to the distribution of drugs." R.187:12. He claimed 
that it was expert testimony under State v. Roihlisberger, 2006 UT 49,147 P.3d 
1176, and advised the court that he "ha[d]n't received any notice from the State 
that their officers are going . . . to be called as experts to testify about those 
things." R.187:12. He argued that "absent that notice, they aren't experts and 
can't testify about it." R.187: 12. The prosecutor argued that the deputies' 
testimony on distribution did not constitute expert testimony. R.187:12-13. The 
trial court agreed, but said that it would "look at this [issue] further" during 
trial. R.187:13-14. 
Deputies Blake Day and Kevin Barrett thereafter testified to several 
factors that, based on their experience and training, were indicative of 
distribution. They testified that the quantity of methamphetamine found on 
Gardner "generally would be broken up into smaller baggies" for sale, R.187:75-
76, 80, 138; that the "multiple quantities of baggies" and $666 in cash were 
indicative of distribution, R.187: 76; that the piece of paper with the financial 
-3-
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information of different people and/or businesses was significant because users 
often finance their drug problem by "counterfeit[ing] checks and/or enter[ing] 
someone's account information to gain funds/' R.187: 76, 131-32; and that 
Gardner and the driver "fit the scenario" of "two people working together to 
distribute drugs," where "the passenger holds the drugs and does the dealing 
while the driver drives them to the meet spots," R.187:101. 
Defense counsel objected to the deputies' testimony, but the trial court 
denied the objections. See R.187: 75-76,80-81,101,131-32,139-40. Counsel also 
moved for a mistrial, but that too was denied. R.187:139,160-64,175. At the 
close of all the evidence, however, the trial court instructed the jury to 
"disregard" Deputy Barrett's testimony regarding the significance of the large 
quantity of methamphetamine. R.187:169-75,181. Although the court was "still 
of the opinion" that it correctly denied the objections, it gave the instruction "in 
an abundance of caution." R.187:169-75. The court explained to the jury that 
they were "to determine whether or not the State is proving a distribution case" 
and that Deputy Barrett's "opinion.. . on that issue is not relevant." R.187:181. 
Conviction, sentence, and appeal. Following the one-day trial, a jury 
found Gardner guilty of both counts as charged. R.153,158-62; R.187:199. He 
was sentenced to a suspended prison term of one-to-fifteen years, a concurrent 
-4-
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jail term of 180 days with credit for time served, and placed on supervised 
probation for 36 months. R.169-71. He timely appealed. R.177-78. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While working patrol, Deputy Blake Day stopped a green Hyundai for a 
cracked windshield and failing to signal. R.186:5; R.187:62-63. Gardner was the 
lone passenger in the car. R.187:65-66. A computer check of the driver revealed 
that he had several outstanding warrants for his arrest and was classified as a 
safety risk for concealed weapons, mental instability, and drug use. R.186:5; 
R.187:67. Day radioed for backup and K-9 Deputy Kevin Barrett arrived soon 
after. R.186:5-6; R.187:67,140-41. Day met with Barrett at Barrett's patrol 
vehicle, advised him of the situation, and the two then returned to the stopped 
car. R.186:12. Deputy Day asked the driver if he had any weapons or 
contraband in the vehicle and the driver responded that he had a knife or knives 
in the car. R.186:6,8-9,12; R.187:68,117-18. Deputy Day then directed the driver 
to exit the car and proceeded to arrest him on the warrants. R.186:5-6; R.187:69. 
While Day was dealing with the driver, Deputy Barrett watched Gardner 
from the passenger side of the car. R.186:12-13. When he first saw Gardner, 
Gardner's "hands . . . were between his legs on the seat/7 he was "very 
nervous/' and "he kept shuffling his hands underneath his legs and then 
bringing them out and making a lot of movements with his hands." R.186:12; 
-5-
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R 1 87:11 8,1 11 42 I '1 lis was "a danger sign" for Deputy Barrett, suggesting that 
Gardner "might be reaching for a w eapon." R.l8 M s Wher i he 1 hen informed 
Gardner that iK drixor was being arrested and the vehicle impounded , 
( u .nmer 's nervon* tvh<-,\ u- increased. R.l 86:1 3 1 1; R 1 87:11 8.' 
and [the presence of] an u n k n o w n knife in an u n k n o w n location;" Deputy 
Barrett "became concerned lhal ihe knife might be with Mr. Gardner." 
R.186:14 1 7 1 8. As a re^uii, r.e requested >w Gardner exit the vehicle ai"u; asiv,.; 
n : i;> • i \ <; - < )i L 1: tin i R 1 86:1 I • R 1 81: : -
(in - K said that he d id not , D e p u t y Barrett a sked h i m "if he m i n d e d if [he] 
gave h i m a Terry frisk." R.186:14; R.187:70-71. Iii response , Gardne r " turned 
around and raised his arms out, and Deputy Barrett proceeded to pat him 
down ' R 1 8;; • / 1 ; R.l 86:1 - 1 1 5,1 9 20 • ' " • " , • • 
1 ' ~- Depi it ) Barret! saw a glass pipe IA it'll w\ lite residi le 
"poking uui oi die top of the [open] pocket" of Gardner ' s pants . R.187:120-21; 
R.186:15 -1 6. Recognizing it as "a pipe commoi ily i lsed to smoke narcoti.es," 
Deputy Barrett pulled ,; ^.^t o: i^iUJiKi s pants pocket and a.sked w hat was 
ii iside It: t..e p »ipe. R.l 81'/ : / :"1 ,1 21 ; R . l 86:1 6 Gardi ter tol i 1 iin t 1:1 ic ii/i • i i • vas 
methamphetamine . R.186:16; R.187:122. 
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Deputy Barrett placed Gardner under arrest and conducted a search of his 
person incident to arrest. R.187:122,136. He found two small, green Ziploc bags 
of cocaine, a sandwich bag containing three more small, green Ziploc bags, a 
cellophane cigarette wrapper containing ten Seroquel tablets, $666 in cash, an 
iPod, and a sandwich bag containing miscellaneous items, including a piece of 
paper that had written on it the names, addresses, and account numbers 
(including expiration dates) of two individuals and a business. R.187:71-72,122-
24,128-33,139,143,179-80; SE8. He also found a baggie containing a large 
quantity of methamphetamine in Gardner's handcuffed hands, which Gardner 
admitted to retrieving from his back pocket. R.187:127-28,138. 
After waiving his Miranda rights, Gardner claimed ownership of the cash, 
but said he was holding the drugs for the driver in exchange for 
methamphetamine. R.187:72-73,135-36. Deputy Barrett suggested to Gardner 
that he was "playing a drug deal for the driver." R.187:136. Gardner did not 
deny the accusation, but said nothing. R.187:136. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Weapons frisk. The search of Gardner's person was justified as a 
protective frisk for weapons under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The driver of 
the car had outstanding warrants and was a known safety risk. Deputy Barrett 
heard the driver indicate that there was a knife or knives in the car but its 
-7-
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location was unknown. And when Deputy Barrett first saw Gardner, his hands 
"were between his legs on the seat/7 Gardner appeared very nervous and he 
"kept shuffling his hands underneath his legs and then bringing them 01it" 
Moreover, this bel lavioi ii lcreased w 1 t „ e i it„1 old 1 he; dri\ er w asbeii igarresl edai tcl, 
1 « , »* ••* > • : - ' 'K :\ iggested that 
Gardner may be a rmed wi th the knife referenced by the driver was reasonable 
and justified the frisk. 
11i.,e frisk was also justified pursuant to Gardner 's consent. Deputy Barrett 
asked Gardner "if h e n 1.I.1 t,,ded ' i f he gave l tin 1, a 7 et ;• 1/frisk Ii L response (JrirdiuT 
simply turned a round and raised his arms. Although Gardner said nothing, his 
actions signaled unequivocal consent. Moreover, nothing in the circumstances 
suggested that the consent was the produc t of duress or coercion. There was no 
clain 1, of a„i ltl torit\ , 1 to trickery , a„i i,,,d, 1 10 e:; ;1 ribitioi 1, c f f :)i :e 
II Expert notice " 1 1 lis C01 irt 1 leed 1 i„.ol • iecide v\ hel 1 i„ei * the depi ill ies' 
testimony relating to distribution constituted expert testimon). Assuming, 
arguendo, that it was, pursuant 1 o subsections (5) and (6) of the expert 
notificatioi 1 statute, the State was not required,, to give formal 1 totice :>f tl leir 
Irstimoi'N ii|"lrr >IIKPI lion ('') ^nltuicnt nolm' W.IS pr.<\id<.l it Hu* 
preliminary hearing. And under subsection (6), sufficient notice was provided 
for through general discovery. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE WEAPONS FRISK OF DEFENDANTS PERSON WAS 
LAWFUL 
Gardner moved to suppress the evidence seized from his person, arguing 
that the officer's frisk for weapons violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See 
R.23-30. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the initial weapons search 
was justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and pursuant to Gardner's 
consent. R.49-50. This Court should affirm. 
* * * 
"[W]henever practicable/7 police officers must"obtain advance judicial 
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure/' Terry, 392 
U.S. at 20. Searches conducted without a warrant "are presumptively 
unreasonable, though the [Supreme] Court has recognized a few limited 
exceptions to this general rule." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984); 
accord Arizona v. Gant, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1710,1716 (2009). Those exceptions 
include "a search that is conducted pursuant to consent," Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,219 (1973), and "a carefully limited search of the outer 
clothing" for weapons when there is reason to believe a suspect is armed and 
dangerous, Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31. The challenged search in this case was 
justified under both exceptions. 
-9-
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'""! ' I '1 ie weapons frisk of Defendant was justifed under Terry v. 
Ohir-
A it-nu I risk for weapons is "constitutionally permissible" it IK o 
coi iditions are satisfied: (1 ) 1 1 leii i\ estigatory stop mi i si be law ft il " ai i :i (2) 1 1 te 
police officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed aiid 
dangerous," Arm ma v. Johnson, "~ . P O S .O. 781 ,784(2009). The 
weapons frisk of Gardner satisfied both conditions. 
1 "Illllln," i n i l i i i l «siii(» \\ii'i Li< 111 ill. 
The Supreme Court in Johnson explained that "in a traffic-stop setting, the 
first Terry condition—a lawful investigatory stop is mot whenever it is lawful 
for poll* r to vU'iuin an automobiu ,*iu: its occupants pending mqiri T i 
' •: ' \ S • • ' - . - * • , . i ^ - . i : - e 
to believe any occupant of the vehicle ib inv olvcu n; v.i;nu*iai a^a\ r v . lu. in 
this case, Deputy Day's observations that the1 driver failed to signal when 
turning (and that the ca t had a UCK keu \ indshield) provided a w ^ » JM^ K-r 
il 1 t,c ; s to i > St >t *Siah \v \ i izzit " .21305 1 J I \ j : j > 261 , 1 f : 1 1 6P 3- 1969 Ga rd i u ii 1 i, is 
not argued otherwise. See Aplt. Brf. at 13-21. 
2 The deputy reasonably suspected that Defendant was armed 
and dangerous. 
"""" I o ji isti fy a patdo\ v i i off 1: te drh er or a passenger di iring a 1 i affic stop, 
. . . the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the 
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frisk is armed and dangerous/' Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 784; accord State v. Baker, 
2010 UT 18, \ 41,229 P.3d 650. Accordingly, "the officer must be able to point to 
specific facts which, considered with rational inferences from those facts/' 
support his or her suspicions. State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, \ 14, 78 P.3d 590. 
"The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue 
is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be 
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Terry, 
392 U.S. at 27. 
When evaluating the propriety of a Terry frisk, the reviewing court 
employs an objective test, "view[ing] the articulable facts in their totality and 
avoid [ing] the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation from 
each other." Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 14. Although an officer's hunch is not 
sufficient to justify a frisk, "due weight must be given . . . to the specific 
reasonable inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in 
light of his experience." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. As recognized in Warren, "this 
process allows officers to draw upon their own experience and training to make 
determinations based on the cumulative facts before them that may elude an 
untrained person." Warren, 2003 UT 36, \ 14 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 
U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). Based on the totality of the circumstances present in this 
-11-
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case I> : * • " ^ * "w v*\\"U .« ,', if r- lvhe' i at his safety or that of others 
was in danger.'' I'crry, 592 U.S. at 1\. 
Gardner's companion, who was driving the car, had outstanding warrants 
and was a known safety risk for carrying weapons, mei il alii istal: ilit) ai i. idrug 
use See R 1 87:67. Depi lty Barrel 1 • I: leard 1 1 le d ri \ • ei I ell Depi it) Day 1 lia/l tl itei e 
was a knife or knives in the car. R.186:18; R187:68,117 18. And w hen he 
initially saw Gardner sitting in the front passenger seat, Gardner's hands "were 
betweer hi^ lor^ on the seat, " Gardner appeared "very nervous, and 1 ie kept 
: i-fiiii; l i ' - . . •• r : Ins \vy}s dinl l inn hi iri*»111^ \ llu-iiu ut ami i n a h n g 
• • ^ • .mils ' K.I87: 118,141-42. This was a "danger 
s igr *<•• Deputy Barrett as "someone who might be reaching for a weapon." 
R.187:142. Then, w h e n Deputy Barrett informed Gardner that the driver was 
being arrestee ..*..,! Liu- ^ u t jnpou; ..u ,;, .^ .ui\;jier's nervous beha\ ior increased. 
•* « • • •: - . ; • - * ' ! : • » « 'et t's belief 1 hat"tl leki u fe 
might be with Mr. Gardner, the passenger." R.186:14. 
Gardner argues that this case is controlled by State v. Bi iker, where the 
Utah Supreme v. .mn iield that, despite finding multiple knives in the vehicle, an 
officer's 7 ern f frisk of a passei iger w as i 10I si lpported h} reasonable suspicioi it. 
See Baker, 2010 UT 18, f f 41-56. But two important factual differences separate 
the two cases and compel a different result here. First, the knives identified by 
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the occupants in Baker were voluntarily surrendered to the officers. See id. at Iff 
42-43. In contrast, the knife or knives identified by the driver here remained in 
an "unknown location/' even as Gardner "shuffl[ed] his hands underneath his 
legs" and acted with increased nervousness. R.186:14; R.187: 118,141-42. 
Second, the officers in Baker testified that nothing in the occupants' behavior 
gave them reason to fear for their safety. Baker, 2010 UT 18, | 50. In contrast, 
Deputy Barrett testified that he was "concerned that the knife might be with Mr. 
Gardner" based on "Gardner's nervousness[,] . . . [the driver's] weapons 
historyf,] and [the presence of] an unknown knife in an unknown location." 
R.186:14. 
Gardner contends that the driver's history as a safety risk is irrelevant in 
assessing whether he was armed and dangerous. See Aplt. Brf. at 15,17. But as 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court, "a car-passenger... will often 
be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest 
in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing." Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,304-05 (1999). Accordingly, Deputy Barrett was right in 
considering that fact in his assessment of the danger. 
Gardner makes several other challenges, but all fail. He notes that Deputy 
Day did not see him making any furtive movements, Aplt. Brf. at 17, but Day 
was dealing with the driver—it was Deputy Barrett who was watching Gardner, 
-13-
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see R.186:12, R.187:141-42. He asserts that Deputy Barrett would have seen him 
conceal a knife because he was observing him continuously. Aplt. Brf. at 17-18. 
But when Deputy Barrett "initially saw" Gardner, his hands "were between his 
legs on the seat." R.187:142. As evidence that there was no reason to believe he 
was armed and dangerous, Gardner points to the fact that he was cooperative 
and told the deputy that he had no weapons. See Aplt. Brf. at 18-19. But an 
officer is not required to accept a suspect's explanation at face value or even give 
it any weight. See United States v. Buckner, 179 F.3d 834,838 (9th Cir. 1999). This 
is especially so where the explanation is inconsistent with the suspect's 
behavior, as here. 
Gardner asserts that "[o]ther than exhibiting nervous behavior which 
'increased when [he was told] the driver was being arrested,' there was nothing 
about [his] conduct that made the officer believe he was 'being disruptive or 
aggressive or threatening in any manner.'" Aplt. Brf. at 18 (quoting R.187:118 
and State v. Lamond, 2003 UT App 101, f 20, 68 P.3d 1043). But Gardner's 
increased nervousness at the prospect of the driver's arrest and the vehicle's 
impoundment cannot simply be discounted. "[T]he risk of a violent encounter 
in a traffic-stop setting 'stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist 
stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more 
serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.'" Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 787 
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(quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,413 (1997)). "And the motivation of a 
passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime is every 
bit as great as that of the driver." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413; accord Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 
at787. 
Finally, Gardner claims that "even if the circumstances of the stop created 
a reasonable suspicion, [Deputy] Batrrett mitigated the danger by ordering [him] 
out of the vehicle." Aplt. Brf. at 15, 19. But ordering occupants out of the 
vehicle "mitigates the inherent dangerousness" of the simple traffic stop, "where 
other indicia of dangerousness are absent/' Warren, 2003 UT 36, ]f 27 (emphases 
added). It does not sufficiently mitigate danger to officer safety when "other 
indicia of dangerousness" are present. Indeed, because the knife referred to by 
the driver had not been located, Deputy Barrett had every reason to believe, 
given Gardner's hand movements and nervousness, that Gardner may have 
concealed the knife on his person. His exit from the vehicle would do little to 
mitigate the risk to the deputies' safety under these circumstances. 
* * * 
In sum, the facts available to Deputy Barrett at the moment of the 
weapons frisk supported a reasonable belief "'that the action taken was 
appropriate/" Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^ 14 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). In 
any event, Gardner consented to the frisk. 
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B. The weapons frisk was conducted pursuant to Defendant's 
voluntary consent. 
"A consent [search] is valid only if '(1) [t]he consent was given 
voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of [a] 
prior illegality/ " State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 47,63 P.3d 650 (quoting State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1262 (Utah 1993)). The consent search here satisfied 
both requirements. 
1. Defendant's consent to the weapons frisk was voluntarily 
given.2 
As noted, a consent to search must be "'f reely and voluntarily given,,,/ i.e., 
the consent may "not be coerced, by explicit or implied means, by implied threat 
or covert force." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 228 (quoting Bumper v. North 
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,548 (1968)). In short, the consent must be "'the product of 
an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker/" Id. at 225 (quoting 
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,602 (1961)). If it is, the consent is valid and 
the fruits of the search are admitted. If it is not, the consent is invalid and the 
fruits of the search are suppressed. 
2
 "Before a court addresses whether consent was voluntary, it must first 
determine that there was consent," which is a factual finding reviewed for clear 
error. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f^ 48. Gardner does not challenge the trial court's 
finding of consent, but the court's legal conclusion that it was voluntary, 
claiming that it was in submission to coercive police authority. See Aplt. Brf. at 
22-26. 
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When relying upon the consent exception to justify a search, the 
prosecution '"has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and 
voluntarily given.'" Id. at 222 (quoting Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548 (1968)). As 
explained by this Court in Hansen, "[t]he appropriate standard to determine 
voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances, and the burden of proof is by 
[a] preponderance of the evidence." 2002 UT 125, ^ 56, 63 P.3d 650. 
Under the totality of the circumstances test, "a court should carefully 
scrutinize both the details of the detention, and the characteristics of the 
defendant." Id. (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225). "[0]ne factor to be 
considered in the totality of the circumstances" is whether there is "clear and 
positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given." State v. 
Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ]f 36, 227 P.3d 1251 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). While the existence of such testimony supports a finding of voluntary 
consent and vice versa, "its presence or absence is not itself determinative." Id. 
Other factors that may show a lack of duress or coercion include: 
(1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 
(2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a mere 
request to search; (4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 
(5) the absence of deception or trick[ery] on the part of the officer. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ]f 56; accord Tripp, 2010 UT 9, | 37. A review of all the 
circumstances in this case establishes that Gardner's consent was voluntary. 
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Deputy Barrett merely requested consent to search, "ask[ing] [Gardner] if 
he minded7' if he frisked him for weapons. R.186:14,19; R.187:70. There was no 
claim of authority to do so, use of trickery, or an exhibition of force. Gardner 
complains that he "was faced with the presence of four uniformed officers, one 
of which was 'covering' [Deputy] Barrett, presumably meaning he was armed, 
and two police dogs/' Aplt. Brf. at 25-26. But no such evidence was adduced at 
the suppression hearing. See R.186. And in any event, only one dog was 
deployed, and it was not deployed until sometime after Gardner's arrest. See 
R.187:77-78.3 The record also demonstrates that only two officers — Deputies 
Day and Barrett—were directly involved at the time, and nothing indicates that 
in "covering" Deputy Barrett during the frisk, Deputy Day did anything more 
than watch as the frisk was performed. See R.187:69-70. 
Moreover, and as conceded by Gardner himself, see Aplt. Brf. at 20, the 
evidence demonstrates that Gardner was cooperative during the encounter. 
Officer Barrett testified that when he asked Gardner if he minded if he frisked 
him, Gardner "turned around and raised his arms out." R.187:71. This was 
"clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely 
given." Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ^ 36 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
3
 Deputy Barrett was the other K-9 unit, but nothing in the record suggests 
that he ever deployed his dog. See R.187:69. 
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Indeed, there was nothing ambiguous about Gardner's actions—they evidenced 
unequivocal consent to the deputy's request to conduct a frisk. 
Gardner relies heavily on an Illinois Supreme Court decision—People v. 
Anthony, 761 N.E.2d 1188 (111. 2001). See Aplt. Brf. at 23-25. The facts here, 
however, are distinguishable. First and foremost, the defendant in Anthony 
"assumed the position of an arrestee: he spread his legs apart and put his hands 
on top of his head/7 761 N.E.2d at 1193. Such nonverbal conduct was 
ambiguous because it implied that Anthony believed he was about to be 
arrested, not simply frisked. In contrast, Gardner assumed the position of a 
frisk, with his arms simply raised. There was nothing ambiguous about his 
actions. Moreover, Gardner was not subjected to "a series of subtly and 
increasingly accusatory questions," as was Anthony. Id. Deputy Barrett simply 
asked Gardner if he had any weapons or property and then asked Gardner if he 
minded if he frisked him. See R.187: 70-71. 
In any event, the decision in Anthony is questionable. The majority 
opinion recognized that an individual "may convey consent to search by 
nonverbal conduct." Anthony, 761 N.E.2d at 1192-93. And indeed, other courts 
addressing the issue agree. See, e.g., United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858,863 (7th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 765-66 (10th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Chan-]imenez, 125 F.3d 1324,1328 (9th Cir. 1997). Yet, as observed by 
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the dissent in Anthony, "[i]f . . . defendant's gesture in [that] case was 
ambiguous, it is difficult to conceive of any nonverbal gesture, short of nodding 
one's head in assent, that could be construed as unambiguous/7 761 N.E.2d at 
1196 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Even then, a nod could be construed as 
ambiguous. As discussed, Gardner's nonverbal conduct was even clearer than 
Anthony's gesture. Were this Court to apply Anthony to this case, it would 
"effectively eliminate[ ] nonverbal conduct as a means of conveying consent." 
Id. The Fourth Amendment does not require such a result. 
2. Defendant's consent was not obtained by police exploitation 
of a prior illegality. 
Gardner argues that even if voluntary, his consent was invalid because it 
was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. See Aplt. Brf. at 26-29. 
Specifically, he claims that he was unlawfully detained after he was asked to exit 
the vehicle. See Aplt. Brf. at 27-29. Gardner concedes that he did not raise this 
claim below and must therefore show plain error. See Aplt. Brf. at 27. He 
cannot meet that burden. 
In the first place, where there existed a reasonable suspicion that Gardner 
was armed and dangerous, his exit from the vehicle was not sufficient to 
mitigate the deputy's safety concerns. See supra, at 15. And in the second place, 
Deputy Day was still in the process of completing the arrest and had not yet 
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conducted the weapons search of the vehicle. As made clear in Johnson, "[t]he 
temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains 
reasonable, for the duration of the stop," which normally "ends when the police 
have no further need to control the scene." 129 S.Ct. at 788. Until the deputies 
had completed the arrest, including the vehicle search for weapons, there was a 
need to control the scene and the stop was not at an end. Gardner has thus 
failed to show any error, much less plain error. 
* * * 
In sum, the totality of the circumstances supports the trial court's 
conclusion that Gardner voluntarily consented to the weapons frisk. Moreover, 
that consent was not obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. 
II. 
TESTIMONY THAT CERTAIN EVIDENCE WAS INDICATIVE 
OF DISTRIBUTION WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
In his second point on appeal, Gardner argues that the deputies' 
testimony relating to distribution constituted expert testimony under rule 702, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, and was thus subject to the formal notice requirement 
of section 77-17-13(1), Utah Code Annotated (West 2004). Aplt. Brf. at 35-48. He 
contends that because the prosecutor did not provide that notice, the trial court 
erred in admitting the testimony and denying his motion for mistrial. Aplt. Brf. 
at 34,48-50. He claims that the court's instruction to disregard Deputy Barrett's 
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testimony as to quantity was insufficient to cure the alleged error. Aplt. Brf. at 
48-50. This Court need not reach the issues raised by Gardner, but may affirm 
the judgment of the trial court on the alternative ground that the prosecutor was 
not required to give the subject notice.4 
Subsection (1) of the expert notice statute provides that a party 
"intend[ing] to call any expert to testify in a felony case at t r i a l . . . shall give 
notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days 
before trial." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a). Subsection (1) notice must 
include "the name and address of the expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and" 
either a copy of the expert's written report, a written explanation of the expert's 
proposed testimony, or notice that the expert is available for consultation. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(b). Gardner argues that the prosecutor was required to 
give that notice in this case and failed to do so. See Aplt. Brf. at 34. He ignores, 
however, other provisions of the expert notification statute which rendered 
subsection (1) inapplicable in this case. 
The expert notice statute carves out two exceptions to its subsection 
(1) notice requirement. Such notice is not required: (1) where the expert is an 
4
 This Court may affirm the judgment of the district court on alternative 
grounds, so long as they are "apparent on the record" and "sustainable by the 
factual findings" below. State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ 9, 76 P.3d 1159. 
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employee of the State or one of its political subdivisions, or (2) where the expert 
testified at the preliminary hearing. The State in this case was exempt from 
filing subsection (1) notice under both exceptions. 
1. The prosecutor was exempt from providing formal notice of 
expert testimony under subsection (6) of the expert 
notification statute. 
Under subsection (6), the State is not required to provide subsection (1) 
notice if its expert is a state or county employee and general discovery provides 
the defendant with reasonable notice that the expert may testify: 
This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an 
employee of the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the 
opposing party is on reasonable notice through general discovery 
that the expert may be called as a witness at trial, and the witness is 
made available to cooperatively consult with the opposing party 
upon reasonable notice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6). The State satisfied these requirements. 
The deputies were employees of Salt Lake County, a political subdivision 
of the State. See R.187:60,114. Moreover, general discovery placed Gardner on 
reasonable notice that they would be called as experts at trial. Defense counsel 
filed a discovery request soon after Gardner's initial appearance —almost one 
full year before trial — seeking, among other things, identification of all 
inculpatory evidence, a list of responding officers, copies of their reports, and a 
list of witnesses the State intended to call at trial. R.13-18. The record 
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establishes that counsel received the police reports at least eight months before 
trial. See R.186:10, 21 (defense counsel referring to police reports of Deputies 
Day and Barrett at hearing on motion to suppress held eight months before 
trial). Additionally, the State did not oppose the discovery request—as it did a 
subsequent request for the criminal rap sheet of the driver in this case — and 
Gardner never filed a motion to compel. See R.95-97. Accordingly, it can only 
be assumed that all of the requested information was provided.5 
This discovery was more than sufficient to place the defense on notice that 
the State would rely on the deputies' expertise alone to establish that the drugs 
found on Gardner were intended for distribution.6 Any claim to the contrary is 
belied by defense counsel's motion to exclude the testimony before trial even 
began. Before trial ever began, defense counsel demonstrated that she 
understood that the State would be relying on the deputies' "training and 
expertise" to testify as to the significance of the quantity of drugs, cash, numbers 
of packages, and other evidence relating to an intent to distribute drugs. See 
R.187:12-14. Counsel then attempted to exclude that evidence—before the State 
5
 The trial court also appears to have granted the State's discovery request 
based, at least in part, on the State's compliance w ith Gardner's initial discovery 
request. See R.55-63. 
6
 The State did provide subsection (1) notice of its intent to call a Utah 
Crime Lab criminalist, but the notice made clear that his testimony would be 
limited to identification of the drugs. See R.64. 
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ever sought to introduce it. This course of action establishes that the discovery 
provided by the State did, in fact, place Gardner on "reasonable notice . . . that 
the [deputies] may be called as [expert] witness[es] at trial." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-17-13(6).7 The State was therefore not subject to the subsection (1) notice 
requirement. 
2. The prosecutor was exempt from providing formal notice of 
expert testimony under subsection (5) of the expert 
notification statute. 
Subsection (5) of the expert witness notification statute further provides 
that an expert's testimony at a preliminary hearing satisfies the notice 
requirement of subsection (1): 
For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a 
preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's 
qualifications, and a report of the expert's proposed trial testimony 
as to the subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary 
hearing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5)(a). The preliminary hearing held on August 21, 
2008 satisfied this provision. 
7
 Subsection (6) also provides that the witness must be "made available to 
cooperatively consult with the opposing party upon reasonable notice/' Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6). Nothing in the record suggests that Gardner gave such 
notice or that the State did not otherwise make the deputies available upon such 
notice. 
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The August 21, 2008 minute entry indicates that Gardner waived the 
preliminary hearing. See R.19-20. A closer review of the record, however, 
reveals that the entry is erroneous. In his motion to suppress, Gardner relied on, 
and cited to, testimony from the preliminary hearing. See R.23-24. Moreover, 
the November 20,2008 minute entry for the suppression hearing indicates that 
Gardner's counsel "stipulate[d] to testimony at the Preliminary Hearing" for 
purposes of his motion. R.42. And at that evidentiary hearing, defense counsel 
cross-examined both Deputy Day and Deputy Barrett on their preliminary 
hearing testimony. See R.186: 19-20, 28. The preliminary hearing, therefore, 
satisfied this notice provision and the State was thus not required to file a notice 
under subsection (l).8 
"k * "k 
In sum, this Court need not reach the issue as to whether the deputies' 
testimony concerning "intent to distribute" constituted expert testimony under 
rule 702. Assuming, arguendo, that it was, the State was not required to provide 
subsection (1) notice, because Gardner was placed on "reasonable notice 
through general discovery the [deputies] may be called as [expert] witness [es] at 
8
 Section 77-17-13(5)(b) provides that "[u]pon request," the State must 
"provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae" if it 
called an expert at the preliminary hearing. Nothing in the record suggests that 
such a request was made or that the State did not otherwise comply with this 
provision. 
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trial." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6). Additionally, the deputies' testimony at 
the preliminary hearing satisfied the notice requirements of section 77-17-13.9 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted August 18, 2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEFFREY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
9
 Even assuming, arguendo, that the State was required to provide 
subsection (1) notice, exclusion of the evidence was not the appropriate remedy. 
The remedy of exclusion only applies where the State acted in bad faith in not 
providing the notice and nothing suggests that the State acted in bad faith. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4). Gardner, therefore, was required to seek a 
continuance, but did not do so. See id. And in any event, any error was harmless 
given Gardner's statement to the deputies admitting that he was holding the 
drugs for the driver in exchange for drugs —an admission that established 
accomplice liability. See R.187:136. 
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U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (West 2004) 
(l)(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any 
expert to testify in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a 
preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the party intending to call the expert shall give 
notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 
30 days before trial or 10 days before the hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, 
the expert's curriculum vitae, and one of the following: 
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or 
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed 
testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate 
notice to prepare to meet the testimony; and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively 
consult with the opposing party on reasonable notice. 
(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any 
fee charged by the expert for the consultation. 
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole 
or part on the results of any tests or other specialized data, the party 
intending to call the witness shall provide to the opposing party the 
information upon request. 
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or 
the information concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the 
party receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice of 
witnesses whom the party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's 
testimony, including the information required under Subsection 
(l)(b). 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially 
comply with the requirements of this section, the opposing party 
shall, if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a 
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continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to 
meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this 
section is the result of bad faith on the part of any party or 
attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. The 
remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony will only apply if 
the court finds that a party deliberately violated the provisions 
of this section. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a 
preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's 
qualifications, and a report of the expert's proposed trial testimony 
as to the subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary 
hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the 
preliminary hearing shall provide the opposing party with a 
copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior 
to trial or any hearing at which the expert may be called as an 
expert witness. 
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is 
an employee of the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the 
opposing party is on reasonable notice through general discovery 
that the expert may be called as a witness at trial, and the witness is 
made available to cooperatively consult with the opposing party 
upon reasonable notice. 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR - 9 2009 
By-
^ft AKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-Va-
DERRICK WADE GARDNER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 
ON January 5th ,2009 
Case No. 081902472 
Honorable PAUL G. MAUGHN 
On November 20th, 2008, the above-captioned matter came before this Court on 
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Those present were: the defendant, DERRICK WADE 
GARDNER and Samuel Newton, the defendant's attorney, and Nathaniel Sanders, the State's 
attorney. The defendant Has requested that this Court suppress evidence derived from the stop 
and search of the defendant and his vehicle in the above listed case. The State and defendant 
submitted motions, memoranda and oral arguments in support of their respective positions. 
Based upon the evidence, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order regarding the defendant's request to suppress evidence. 
FINDING OF FACTS 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds the following by a preponderance of evidence: 
1. On March 23rd, 2008, Officers initiated a traffic stop involving the defendant. 
2. The driver of the vehicle had a history of drugs and dangerous weapons. 
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3. The driver admitted that there was/were knive(s) in the car. 
4. The defendant acted with heightened nervousness upon being asked to exit the vehicle. 
5. At that time the knife had not yet been located. 
6. Deputy Barret asked to frisk the defendant and the defendant raised his arms and turned 
around. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes the following: 
1. Knowledge of the driver's history with weapons, the driver's admission that there 
was a knife in the vehicle and the defendant's nervousness justified the Terry frisk. 
2. By raising both arms and turning around, the defendant gave sufficient indication of 
consent to the search. 
ORDER OF THE COURT 
1. Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence. 
: , 2009. DATED this 5 day of ~)»4 
PAUL G. MA 
Third District ^aage 
APPROVED AS TO CONTENT AND FORM. 
Robert Engar, Attorney for Defendant 
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